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Abstract. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems are usually crit-
icized because they lack a classification of attack, thus security teams
have to manually inspect any raised alert to classify it. We present a
new approach, Panacea, to automatically and systematically classify at-
tacks detected by an anomaly-based network intrusion detection system.
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Today, security teams aim to automate the management of security events,
both to optimize their workload and to improve the chance of detecting malicious
activities. However, the automation of the security management tasks poses new
challenges.
During the years, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been continuously
improved to detect the latest threats. However, some events that were once con-
sidered dangerous have become “not-relevant” (e.g., port scans). Malicious ac-
tivities conducted by automatic scanners, BOTnets, and so-called script-kiddies
can generate a large number of security alerts. Although true positives when
detected by an IDS, these kinds of activities cannot normally be considered a
serious threat. Most of them attempt to exploit old vulnerabilities that have
already been fixed. The fact that a remote automatic scanner is attempting to
replicate a 5-year old attack against a now-secure PHP script on a certain web
server is no longer important. As a result, the number of security alerts, consist-
ing of irrelevant true positives and false positives, has increased over the years.
The most harmful attacks currently consist of several stages. Ning et al. [1] ob-
serve that “most intrusions are not isolated, but related as different stages of
attacks, with the early stages preparing for the later ones”.
A number of techniques to perform alert correlation have been proposed
(Cuppens and Ortalo [2], Debar and Wespi [3], Ning and Xu [4] and Valeur
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et al. [5]), in order to detect attacks at an early stage, or improve false and
non-relevant alert rates.
Nowadays, several “security information management” (SIM) tools are widely
used by security teams (e.g., the well-known OSSIM [6]). They are used to ease
the management of the security infrastructure, as they integrate with heteroge-
neous security systems, and can perform a number of tasks automatically. Among
those tasks, SIM tools automate the alert filtering and correlation. However, for
the tasks to be effective, the attacks that trigger alerts must be classified to
provide a good deal of information (apart from the usual IP addresses and TCP
ports). In fact, by classifying the attack (e.g., buffer overflow, SQL Injection), it
is possible to set in a more precise way an action the system has to execute to
handle a certain alert. The alert could trigger automatic countermeasures, e.g.,
either because an early attack stage has been detected or because the attack
class is considered to have a great impact on the security, or being forwarded for
manual handling or filtered and stored for later analysis (i.e., correlation) and
statistics.
Determining the class of an attack is trivial for an alert generated by a
signature-based IDS (SBS). Each signature is the result of an analysis of the
corresponding attack conducted by experts: the attack class is manually assigned
during the signature development process (i.e., the alert class is included in the
signature). Thus, usually security teams do not need to further process the alert
to assign a class, and they can set precisely a standard action for the system to
execute when such an alert is triggered.
Problem When an anomaly-based IDS (ABS) raises an alert, it cannot asso-
ciate the alert with an attack class. The system detects an anomaly, but it has too
little information (e.g., only source and destination IP addresses and TCP ports)
to determine the attack class. No automatic or semi-automatic approach is cur-
rently available to classify anomaly-based alerts. Thus, any anomaly-based alert
must be manually processed to identify the alert class, increasing the workload
of security teams. A solution to automate the classification of anomaly-based
alerts is to employ some heuristics (e.g., see Robertson et al. [7]) to analyse the
ABS alert for features of well-known attacks. Although this approach could lead
to good results, it totally relies on the manual implementation of the heuristics
(which could be a labour intensive task), and on the expertise of the operator.
The lack of attack classification affects the overall usability of an ABS, be-
cause it makes difficult (if not impossible) for security teams both to employ alert
correlation techniques and to activate automatic countermeasures for anomaly-
based alerts, and in general to integrate an ABS with a SIM tool.
Contribution In this paper we present Panacea, a simple, yet effective, system
that uses machine learning techniques to automatically and systematically clas-
sify attacks detected by a payload-based ABS (and consequently the generated
alerts as well). The basic idea is the following. Attacks that share some common
traits, i.e., some byte sequences in their payloads, are usually in the same class.
Thus, by extracting byte sequences from an alert payload (triggered by a certain
attack), we can compare those sequences to previously collected data with an
appropriate algorithm, find the most similar alert payload, and then infer the
attack class from the matching alert payload class.
To the best of our knowledge, Panacea is the first system proposed that:
– automatically classifies attacks detected by an ABS, without using pre-
determined heuristics;
– does not need manual assistance to classify attacks (with some exceptions
to be described in Section 1.1).
Panacea requires a training phase for its engine to build the attack classifier.
Once the training phase is completed, Panacea classifies any attack detected by
the ABS automatically.
Limitation of the approach Panacea analyses the generated alert payload to build
its classification model. Thus, any alert generated by attacks/activities that do
not involve a payload (e.g., a port scan or a DDoS) cannot be automatically
classified. As most of the harmful attacks inject some data in target systems, we
do not see this as a serious limitation. However, Panacea cannot work with an
ABS that detects attacks by monitoring network flows. Here we consider only
attacks that target networks, however it is possible to extend the approach to
include host-based IDSs too.
1 Architecture
Panacea consists of two interacting components: the Alert Information Extractor
(AIE) and the Attack Classification Engine (ACE). The AIE receives alerts
from the IDS(s), processes the payload, and extracts significant information,
outputting alert meta-information. This meta-information is then passed to the
ACE that automatically determines the attack class. The classification process
goes through two main stages. First, the ACE is trained with several types of
alert meta-information to build a classification model. The ACE is fed alert meta-
information and the corresponding attack class. The attack class information can
be provided in several ways, either manually by an operator or automatically by
extracting additional information from the original alert (only when the alert
has been raised by an SBS). Secondly, when the training is completed, the ACE
is ready to classify new incoming alerts automatically. We now describe each
component and the working modes of Panacea in detail. Figure 1 depicts Panacea
and its internal components.
1.1 Alert Information Extractor
The first component we examine is the AIE. The extraction of relevant infor-
mation from alert payloads is a crucial step, as it is the basis for attack class
inference. Requirements for this phase are that the extraction function should
capture enough features from the original information (i.e., the payload) to dis-
tinguish alerts belonging to different classes, and it should be efficient w.r.t. the
required memory space. We now describe the analysis techniques we have chosen.
Fig. 1. An overview of the Panacea architecture and the internal components
Extracting and storing relevant information N-gram analysis [8] allows
to capture features of data in an efficient way, and it has been used before in
the context of computer security to detect attacks (Forrester and Hofmeyr [9],
Wang and Stolfo [10]). N-gram analysis is a suitable technique to capture data
features also for the problem of attack classification.
As Wang et al. note [11], by using higher order n-grams (i.e., n-grams where
n > 1) it is possible to capture more data features and to achieve a more precise
analysis. One has to consider that the whole feature space size of a higher-
order n-gram is 256n (where n is the n-gram order). The comparison of byte
frequency values becomes quickly infeasible, also for values of n such as 3 or
4, because the space needed to store average and standard deviation values for
each n-gram grows exponentially (e.g., 640GB would be needed to store 5-grams
statistics). Although a frequency-based n-gram analysis may seem to model data
distribution accurately, Wang et al. experimentally show that a binary-based n-
gram analysis is more precise in the context of network data analysis. In practice,
the fact that a certain n-gram has occurred is stored, rather than computing
average byte frequency and standard deviation statistics. The reason why the
binary approach performs better is that high-order n-grams are more sparse than
low-order n-grams, thus it is more difficult to gather accurate byte-frequency
statistics as the order increases. This approach has an additional advantage,
other than being more precise. Because less information is required, it requires
less space in memory, and we can consider higher-order n-grams (such as 5).
Bitmap The ideal data structure to store binary-based n-gram information is a
bitmap. A bitmap is a type of memory organization used to store information
as spatially mapped arrays of bits. In our case, each map entry (a bit) maps a
certain n-gram: thus the bitmap size depends on the n-gram order. For 3-grams
the bitmap size is 2MB, and for 5-grams the size goes up to 128GB. Here we
follow Wang et al. and we use Bloom filters to overcome the space dimension
problem.
Bloom filter A Bloom filter [12]) is a method to represent a set of S elements
(n-grams in our embodiment) in a smaller space. Formally, a Bloom filter is a
pair 〈b,H〉 where b is a bit map of l bits, initially all set to 0, and H is a set of k
independent hash functions h1 . . . hk. H determines the storage of b in such a way
that, given an element s in S: ∀hk, bi = 1 ⇐⇒ hk(s) mod l = i. In other words,
for each n-gram s in S, and for each hash function hk, we compute hk(s) mod l,
and we use the resulting value as index to set to 1 the bit in b corresponding to it.
When checking for the presence of a certain element s, the element is considered
to be stored in the Bloom filter if and only if: ∀hk, bhk(s) mod l = 1. A BF with
a size of 10KB is sufficiently large to store the alert meta-information resulting
from 5-grams analysis. Figure 2 shows an example of insertion in a BF.
A Bloom filter employs k different hash functions at the same time to decrease
the probability of a false positive (the opposite situation, a false negative, cannot
occur). False positives occur when all of the bit positions calculated for a given
element have been set to 1 when inserting previous elements (as depicted in
Figure 3), due to the collisions generated by hash functions. The false positive
rate for a given Bloom filter is (1 − e knl )k, where n is the number of elements
already stored.
Operational modes The AIE is also responsible for forwarding the attack
class information to the classification engine, when the latter is in training mode.
The attack class can be provided either automatically or manually. In case an
SBS is deployed next to the ABS and it is monitoring the same data, it is
possible to feed the ACE during training both the payload and the attack class
of any alert generated by the SBS. We define this the automatic mode, since
no human operator is required to carry out the attack classification. A human
operator can classify the alerts raised by the ABS (in consistent manner with
the SBS classification), hence integrating those with the alerts raised by the
ABS during the ACE training. We call this the semi-automatic mode. The last
possible operative mode is the manual mode. In this case, any alert is manually
classified by an operator.
Each mode presents advantages and disadvantages. In automatic mode, the
workload is low, but on the other hand the classification accuracy is likely to be
low as well. In fact, the SBS and the ABS are likely to detect different attacks,
only for those alerts that are raised by both engines. Thus, the classification
engine could be trained to classify only a subset of the alerts correctly. The
manual mode requires human intervention but it is likely to produce better
results, since each alert is consistently classified (the classification that comes
out-of-the-box with an SBS could not be suitable). We assume that the alerts
(a) Inserting n-gram “abcde”
(b) Inserting n-gram “pqrst”
Fig. 2. Examples of inserting two different 5-grams. H1, H2 and H3 represent different
hash functions.
raised by the SBS and ABS have already been verified and any false positive
alert has already been purged (e.g., using ALAC [13] or our ATLANTIDES).
1.2 Attack Classification Engine
The ACE includes the algorithm used to classify attacks. Since we are aware
of the attack class information, we consider only supervised machine learning
algorithms. These algorithms generally achieve better results than unsupervised
algorithms (where the algorithm, e.g. K-medoids, deduces classes by measuring
inter-data similarity). The classification algorithm must meet several require-
ments, namely:
– support for multiple classes, as alerts fall in several classes;
Fig. 3. Example of a false positive. The element “zxcvb” has not been inserted in the
Bloom filter. Due to the collisions generated by the hash functions, the test for its
presence returns “true”.
– classification of high-dimensional data, since each bit of the BF data struc-
ture the ACE receives in input is seen as a dimension of analysis;
– fast training phase (the reason for this will be clarified later);
– (optional) estimate classification confidence when in classification phase.
We consider the last requirement optional, as it does not directly influence the
quality of the classification, though it is useful to improve the system usability.
Confidence measures the likelihood of having a correct classification for a given
input. Users can instruct the system to forward any alert whose confidence value
is lower than a given threshold for manual classification, hence reducing the
probability of misclassification (at the price of an increased workload).
We chose two algorithms for our experiments: (1) Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and (2) the RIPPER rule learner. These algorithms implement super-
vised techniques, their training and classification phases are fast and handle
high-dimensional data. Both algorithms perform non-incremental learning. A
non-incremental algorithm iterates on samples several times to build the best
classification model by minimizing the classification error. The whole training
set is then needed at once, and additional samples cannot be incorporated in the
classification model unless the training phase is run from scratch. On the other
hand, an incremental algorithm can modify the model after the main training
phase as new samples become available. An incremental algorithm usually per-
forms worse than a non-incremental algorithm, because the model is not re-built.
Thus, a non-incremental algorithm is the best choice to perform an accurate clas-
sification. However, because it is highly unlikely that we can collect all alerts for
training at once the choice of non-incremental algorithms could be seen as a
limitation of our system.
In practice, thanks to the limited BF memory size, we can store a huge num-
ber of samples and, by applying a “batch training”, we can simulate incremental
learning in non-incremental algorithms. As new training samples become avail-
able, we add them to the batch training set and build the classifier using the
entire set only when a certain number of samples is reached. Then, the classifier
is re-built with the set of “batches” available at that time. Because both SVM
and RIPPER are fast in training, there are no computational issues.
We chose SVM and RIPPER, not only because they meet the requirements,
but for two additional reasons. First, they yield high-quality classifications.
Meyer et al. [14] test the SVM against several other classification algorithms
(available from the R project [15]) on real and synthetic data sets. An SVM
outperforms competitors in 50% of tests and ranks in the top 3 in 90% of them.
RIPPER has been used before in the context of intrusion detection (e.g., on data
relative to system calls and network connections [16, 17]) with good results. Sec-
ondly, because they approach the classification problem differently (geometric
for SVM, and rule-based for RIPPER), the algorithms are supposed to behave
heterogeneously in some circumstances. Hence, we can evaluate which algorithm
is more suitable in different contexts. We will now provide some detail on the
algorithms.
Support Vector Machines (Vapnik and Lerner [18]) is a set of supervised
learning methods used for classification. In the original formulation, an SVM is
a binary classifier. It uses a non-linear mapping to transform the original training
data into a higher dimension. Then, it searches for the linear optimal separating
hyperplane, i.e., a plane that separates the samples of one class from another. An
SVM uses “support vectors” and “margins” to find the optimal hyperplane, i.e.,
the plane with the maximum margin. Lets us consider Figure 4. By selecting an
appropriate non-linear mapping to a sufficiently high dimension, data samples
from two classes can always be separated by a hyperplane. In fact, there are a
number of separating hyperplanes. However, we expect the hyperplane with the
larger margin to be more accurate at classifying future data samples, because it
gives the largest separation “distance” between classes. The margin is calculated
by constructing two parallel hyperplanes, one on each side of the hyperplane,
and then by “pushing them up against” the data sets. Any data samples that
fall on these side hyperplanes are called support vectors.
The original SVM algorithm has been modified to classify non-linear data and
to use multiple classes. Boser et al. [19] introduce non-linear data classification
by using kernel functions (i.e., non-linear functions). The resulting algorithm
is similar, but every dot product is replaced with a non-linear kernel function.
Then, the algorithm proceeds to find a maximal separating hyperplane in the
transformed space.
To support multiple classes, the problem is reduced to multiple binary sub-
problems. Given m classes, m classifiers are trained, one for each class. Any test
sample is assigned to the class corresponding to the largest positive distance.
RIPPER (Cohen [20]) is a fast and effective rule induction algorithm. RIPPER
uses a set of IF-THEN rules. An IF-THEN rule is an expression in the form
Fig. 4. Hyperplanes in a 2-dimensional space. H1 separates samples sets with a small
margin, H2 does that with the maximum margin. The example refers to linearly sepa-
rable data. The support vectors are shown with a thicker red border.
IF <condition> THEN <conclusion>. The IF-part of a rule is called the rule
antecedent. The THEN-part is the rule consequent. The condition consists of one
or more attribute tests, that are logically ANDed. A test ti is in the form ti = v
for categorical attributes (where v is a category label) or either ti ≥ θ or ti ≤ θ
for numerical attributes (where θ is a numerical value). The conclusion contains
a class prediction. If, for a given input, the condition (i.e., all of the attribute
tests) holds true, then the rule antecedent is satisfied and the corresponding
class in the conclusion is returned (the rule is said to “cover” the input). Since
RIPPER employs ordered rules, when a match occurs, the algorithm does not
evaluate other rules. Some examples of rules are:
IF bf [i] = 1 AND . . . AND bf [k] = 1 THEN class = cross-site scripting
IF bf [l] = 1 AND . . . AND bf [m] = 1 . . . AND bf [n] = 1 THEN class = sql
injection
RIPPER builds the rule set for a certain class SCi as follows. The training
data set is split into two sets, a pruning and a growing sets. The classifier is built
using these two sets by repeatedly inserting rules starting from an empty rule
set (the growing set). The algorithm heuristically adds one condition at a time
until the rule has no error rate on the growing set.
RIPPER implements also an optimisation phase, in order to simplify the
rule set. For each rule ri in the rule set, two alternative rules are built; the
replacement of ri and the revision of ri. The replacement of ri is created by
growing an empty rule r
′
i, and then pruning it in order to reduce the error
rate of the rule set including r
′
i on the pruning data set. The revision of ri is
constructed similarly, but the revision rule is built heuristically by adding one
condition at a time to the original ri rather than to an empty rule. Then the
three rules are examined on the pruning data to select the rule with the least
error rate.
When multiple classes C1 . . . Cn are used, RIPPER sorts classes on a sample
frequency basis and induces rules sequentially from the least prevalent class
SC1 to the second most prevalent class SCn−1. The most prevalent class SCn
becomes the default class, and no rule is induced for it (thus, in case of a binary
classification, RIPPER induces rules for the minority class only).
1.3 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Panacea to run our experiments. The pro-
totype is written in Java, since we link to the libraries provided by the Weka
platform [21]. Weka is a well-known collection of machine learning algorithms,
and it contains an implementation of both SVM and RIPPER. Weka provides
also a comprehensive framework to run benchmarks on several data sets under
the same testing conditions. The attacks samples generated by network IDSs, in
the form of alerts, are stored in a database that the system fetches to extract
the alert payload information.
2 Benchmarks
Public data sets for benchmarking IDSs are scarce. It is even more difficult to
find a suitable data set to test Panacea, since no research has systematically
addressed the problem of (semi)automatically classifying attacks detected by an
ABS before. Hence, we have collected three different data sets (referred to as
DSA, DSB and DSC , see below for a description of the data sets) to evaluate
the accuracy of Panacea. These data sets are used to evaluate the accuracy of
Panacea in different scenarios: (1) when working in automatic mode (DSA), (2)
when using an ad hoc taxonomy and the manual mode (DSB) and (3) when
classifying unknown attacks (e.g., generated by two ABSs), having trained the
system with alerts from known attacks (DSB and DSC).
In the literature there are several taxonomies and classifications of security
events. For instance, Howard [22], Hansman and Hunt [23], and the well-known
taxonomy used in the DARPA 1998 [24] and 1999 [25] data sets. Only the latter
classification has been used in practice (in spite of its course granularity, as it
contains only four classes which are unsuitable to classify modern attacks). A
modern IDS employs its own attack classification, which is usually non-standard
and – according to Andersson et al. [26] – difficult to translate into a standard-
ized classification, e.g., the XML-based Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format [27]. In our experiments, we use the Snort classification for benchmarks
with DSA (see [28] for a detailed taxonomy) and the Web Application Security
Consortium Threat Classification [29] for benchmarks with DSB and DSC .
To evaluate the accuracy of the classification model, we use two approaches.
For test (1) and (2), we employ cross-validation. In cross-validation, samples
are partitioned into sub-sets. The analysis is first performed on a single sub-set,
while the other sub-set(s) are retained to validate the initial analysis. In k-fold
cross-validation, the samples are partitioned into k sub-sets. A single sub-set is
retained as the validation data for testing the model, and the remaining k − 1
sub-sets are used as training data to build the model. The process is repeated k
times (the “folds”), using each of the k sets exactly once to validate the model.
Usually the k fold results are combined (e.g., averaged) to generate a single
estimation. The advantage of this method is that all of the samples are used
for both training and validation, and each sample is used for validation exactly
once. We use 10 folds in our experiments, which is a standard value, used in the
Weka testing environment too.
For test 3), we use one of DSB and DSC for training and the other for testing.
The accuracy is evaluated by counting the number of correctly classified attacks.
Attack Class Description # of samples
attempted-recon∗ Attempted information leak 1379
web-application-attack∗ Web application attack 1032
web-application-activity∗ Access to a potentially 599
vulnerable web application
unknown Unknown traffic 66
attempted-user∗ Attempted user privilege gain 45
misc-attack Miscellaneous attack 44
attempted-admin Attempted administrator 32
privilege gain
attempted-dos Attempted Denial of Service 14
bad-unknown Potentially bad traffic 13
Table 1. DSA (alerts raised by Snort): attack classes and samples. It is not surpris-
ing that web-related attacks account for more than 50%, since most Snort signatures
address web vulnerabilities. ∗ marks classes that contain web-related attacks.
DSA contains alerts raised by Snort (see Table 1 for alert figures). To collect
the largest number of alerts possible, we have used several tools to automatically
inject attack payloads (Nessus and a proprietary vulnerability assessment tool).
Attacks have been directed against a system running some virtual machines with
both Linux- and Windows-based installations, which expose several services (e.g.,
web server, DBMS, web proxy, SMTP and SSH). We collected more than 3200
alerts in total, classified in 14 different (Snort) attack classes. However, some
classes have few alerts, thus we select only classes with at least 10 alerts. This
data set (and DSB as well) is synthetic. We do not see this as a limitation
since the alerts cover multiple classes and trigger a large number of different
signatures. We test how the system behaves in automatic mode, the whole set
being generated by Snort.
DSB contains a set of more than 1400 Snort alerts related to web attacks (Ta-
ble 2 provides alert details). To generate this data set, we have used Nessus [30],
Nikto [31] (a web vulnerability scanner), and we have manually injected attack
payloads collected from the well-known site Milw0rm, that hosts a large collec-
tion of web exploits [32]. The attack classification has been performed manu-
ally (manual mode), since Snort does not provide a fine-grained classification of
web-related attacks (alerts are allocated to different classes with other alerts, see
Table 1). Attacks have been classified according to the Web Application Security
Consortium Threat Classification [29].
Attack Class # samples
Path Traversal 931
Cross-site Scripting 399
SQL Injection 73
Buffer Overflow 8
Table 2. DSB : attack classes and samples. Attacks have been classified according to
the Web Application Security Consortium Threat Classification.
DSC is a collection of alerts generated over a period of 2 weeks by two ABSs,
i.e., our POSEIDON [33] and Sphinx [34]. We recorded network traffic directed
to a main web server of the university network, and did not inject any attack.
Afterwards, we processed this data with POSEIDON and Sphinx to generate
alerts. The inspection of alerts and the classification of attacks has been per-
formed manually (using the same taxonomy we apply for DSB). The data set
consists of a set of 100 alerts, and Table 3 reports attack details.
Attack Class # samples
Path Traversal 53
Cross-site Scripting 27
SQL Injection 16
Buffer Overflow 4
Table 3. DSC : attack classes and samples. Attacks have been classified according to
the Web Application Security Consortium Threat Classification.
Tests with DSA We use DSA to validate the general effectiveness of our
approach. There are three factors which influence the classification accuracy,
namely: (1) the number of alerts processed during training, (2) the length of n-
grams used, and (3) the classification algorithm selected. This preliminary test
aims to identify which parameter combination(s) results in the most accurate
classification.
Testing methodology We proceed with a 3-step approach. First, we want to
identify an adequate number of samples required for training: in fact, a too
low number of samples could generate an inaccurate classification. On the other
hand, while it is generally a good idea to have as many training samples as
possible, after some point the benefit from adding additional information could
become negligible. Secondly, we want to identify the best n-gram length. Short
n-grams are likely to be shared among many attack payloads, and the attack di-
versification would be poor (i.e., a number of different attacks contains the same
n-grams). On the other hand, long n-grams are unlikely to be common among
attack payloads, hence it would be difficult to predict a class for a new attack
that does not share a sufficient number of long n-grams. Finally, we analyse how
the classification algorithms work by analysing the overall classification accuracy
(i.e., considering all of the attack classes) and the per-class accuracy. The two
algorithms approach the classification problem in two totally different ways, and
each of them could be performing better under different circumstances.
To avoid bias by choosing a specific attack, we randomly select alerts in the
sub-sets. In fact, by selecting alerts for training in the same order they have been
generated (as opposed to random), we could end up with few (or no) samples
in certain classes, hence influencing the accuracy rate (i.e., a too good, or bad,
value). To enforce randomness, we also run several trials (five) with different
sub-sets and calculate the average accuracy rate. Table 4 reports benchmark
results (the percentage of correctly classified attacks) for SVM and RIPPER.
SVM
n-gram length
RIPPER
n-gram length
#
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
samples
1000 62.6% 76.8% 77.3% 76.7% 66.1% 75.9% 76.2% 75.7%
2000 65.9% 78.6% 78.9% 77.7% 69.4% 76.7% 76.9% 76.4%
3000 66.3% 79.4% 79.6% 78.6% 72.7% 77.2% 77.5% 76.9%
Table 4. Test results on DSA with SVM and RIPPER. We report the average percent-
age of correctly classified attacks of five trials. As the number of samples in the testing
sub-set increases, the overall effectiveness increases as well. Longer n-grams generally
produce better results, up to length 3. SVM performs better than RIPPER by a narrow
margin.
Discussion Tests with DSA indicate that the approach is effective in classifying
attacks. As the number of training samples increases, accuracy increases as well
for both algorithms. Also the n-gram length directly influences the classification.
The number of correctly classified attacks increases as n-grams get longer, up to
3-grams. N-grams of length 4 produce a slightly worse classification, and the same
happens for 1-grams (which achieve the worst percentages). SVM and RIPPER
present similar accuracy rates on 3-grams, with the former being slightly better.
However, if we perform an analysis based on per-class accuracy (see Table 5),
we observe that, although both classification algorithms score high on accuracy
level for the three most populated classes, RIPPER is far more precise than SVM
(in once case, the “web-application-activity” class, by nearly 15%).
When we look at the overall accuracy rate, averaged among the 9 classes, for
DSA, SVM performs better because of the classes with few alerts. If we zoom
into the classes with a significant number of samples, we observe an opposite
behaviour. This means that, with a high number of samples, RIPPER performs
better than SVM.
In Table 5, a sub-set with fewer samples seems to achieve better results (al-
though percentages differ by a narrow margin), when considering the same algo-
rithm. This happens for SVM once then using 1000 training samples (“attempted-
recon” class) and twice when using 2000 training samples (“web-application-
attack” and “web-application-activity” classes). When using 2000 training sam-
ples, RIPPER performs best in the “web-application-activity” class. The reason
for this is that alerts in the sub-sets are randomly chosen, thus a class could
have a different number of samples among trials.
SVM RIPPER
# of samples # of samples
Attack Class 1000 2000 3000 1000 2000 3000
attempted-recon 90.9% 90.5% 90.7% 90.4% 93.9% 94.0%
web-application-attack 79.8% 89.0% 88.8% 97.4% 98.8% 99.1%
web-application-activity 80.8% 81.2% 80.9% 93.7% 96.1% 95.8%
Table 5. Per-class detailed results on DSA, using 3-grams. We report the average
percentage of correctly classified attacks of five trials. RIPPER performs better than
SVM in classifying all attacks, .
Tests with DSB DSB is used to validate the manual mode and the use of
an ad hoc classification. To perform the benchmarks, we use the same n-gram
length that achieves the best results in the previous test. Table 6 details our
findings for SVM and RIPPER.
Discussion The test results on DSB show that Panacea is effective also when
using a user-defined classification, regardless of the classification algorithm is
chosen. Regarding accuracy rates, RIPPER shows a higher accuracy for most
classes, although SVM scores the best classification rate (by a narrow margin).
Only the “buffer overflow” class has a low classification rate. Both algorithms
have wrongly classified most of buffer overflow attacks in the “path traversal”
class. This is because (1) the number of samples is lower than for the other
classes, which are at least 10 times more numerous, and 2) a number of the
Attack Class SVM RIPPER
Path Traversal 98.6% 99.1%
Cross-site Scripting 97.5% 98.4%
SQL Injection 97.6% 96.2%
Buffer Overflow 37.5% 37.5%
Percentage of total attacks
98.0% 97.7%
correctly classified
Table 6. Test details (percentage of correctly classified attacks) onDSB with SVM and
RIPPER. RIPPER achieves better accuracy rates for the two most numerous classes,
although by a narrow margin. We observe the same trend for the rates reported in
Table 5.
path traversal attacks present some byte encoding that resembles byte values
typically used by some buffer overflow attack vectors. In the case of RIPPER,
the “path traversal” class has the highest number of samples, hence no rule is
induced for it and any non-matching samples is classified in this class.
Tests with DSC An ABS is supposed to detect previously-unknown attacks,
for which no signature is available yet. Hence, we need to test how Panacea
behaves when the training is accomplished using mostly alerts generated by an
SBS but afterwards Panacea processes alerts generated by an ABS. For this fi-
nal test we simulate the following scenario. A user has manually classified alerts
generated by an SBS during the training phase (DSB) and she uses the resulting
model to classify unknown attacks, detected by an ABS (POSEIDON). Since we
collected few buffer overflow attacks, we use the Sploit framework [35] to mu-
tate some of the original attack payloads and increase the number of samples
for this class, introducing attack diversity at the same time. Thus, we obtain
additional training samples with a different payload. Table 7 shows the percent-
age of correctly classified attacks by SVM and RIPPER. For the buffer overflow
attacks, we report accuracy values for the original training set (i.e. representing
real traffic) and the “enlarged” training set (in brackets).
Attack Class SVM RIPPER
Path Traversal 98.1% 94.4%
Cross-site Scripting 92.6% 88.9%
SQL Injection 100.0% 87.5%
Buffer Overflow 50.0% (75.0%) 25.0% (50.0%)
Percentage of total attacks
92.0% (93.0%) 89.0% (90.0%)
correctly classified
Table 7. Test details (percentage of correctly classified attacks) on DSC with SVM
and RIPPER. SVM perform better than RIPPER in classifying any attack class. For
the “buffer overflow” class and the percentage of total attacks correctly classified we
report (in brackets) the accuracy rates when Panacea is trained with additional samples
generated using the Sploit framework.
Discussion Tests on DSC show that the SVM performs better than RIPPER
when classifying attack instances that have not been observed before. The accu-
racy rate for the “buffer overflow” class is the lowest, and most of the misclassified
attacks have been classified in the “path traversal” class (see the discussion of
benchmarks for DSB). However, with a higher number of training samples (gen-
erated by using Sploit), the accuracy rate increases w.r.t. previous tests. This
suggest that, with a sufficient number of training samples, Panacea achieves high
accuracy rates.
2.1 Summary of benchmark results
From the benchmarks results, we can draw some conclusions after having ob-
served the following trends:
– the classification accuracy is always higher than 75%
– SVM performs better than RIPPER when considering the classification ac-
curacy for all classes, when not all of them have more than 50-60 samples
(DSA, DSB and DSC)
– RIPPER performs better than SVM when the class has a good deal of train-
ing samples, i.e., at least 60-70 in our experiments (DSA and DSB)
– SVM performs better than RIPPER when the class presents high diversity
and attacks to classify have not been observed during training (DSC)
We can conclude that SVM works better when few alerts are available for
training and when attack diversity is high, i.e., the training alert samples differ
from the alerts received when in classification phase. On the other hand, RIPPER
shows to be more accurate when trained with a high number of alerts.
Evaluating confidence However good Panacea is, the system is not error-free.
The consequences of a misclassification can have a direct impact on the overall
security. Think of a buffer overflow attack, for which usually countermeasures
must take place immediately (because of the possible consequences), that is mis-
classified as a path traversal attack, for which the activation of countermeasures
can be delayed (e.g., after other actions taken by the attacker). This event oc-
curs often in our benchmarks when the system selects the wrong class. Both
SVM and RIPPER can generate a classification confidence value for each at-
tack. This value can be used to evaluate the accuracy of the classification. The
lower the classification value is (in a range from 0.0 to 1.0), the more likely the
classification is wrong (see Table 8 for average confidence values for DSC).
The confidence value can be taken into consideration to detect possible mis-
classification. Users can set a minimum confidence value (e.g., 0.5). Any alert
with a lower confidence value is forwarded to a human operator for manual clas-
sification. With this additional check, we are able to increase the percentage of
total attacks correctly classified up to 95% for SVM and 94% for RIPPER (when
using the standard training set, without additional training samples generated
with Sploit). The additional workload involves also the manual classification of
SVM RIPPER
Average confidence value for correctly classified attacks 0.75 0.62
Average confidence value for misclassified attacks 0.37 0.43
Percentage of total attacks correctly classified without
92.0% 89.0%
confidence evaluation
Percentage of total attacks correctly classified with
95.0% 94.0%
confidence evaluation
# of alerts forwarded for manual classification 10/100 13/100
# of forwarded attacks that were actually wrongly classified 3/10 5/13
# of forwarded attacks that were actually correctly classified 7/10 8/13
Table 8. Effects of confidence evaluation for DSC , when Panacea is trained with the
standard DSB . When considering the classification confidence to forward alerts for
manual classification, the human operator classification increases by 3% and 5% the
overall accuracy rate by inspecting 10 and 13 alerts, out of 100, when Panacea uses
SVM and RIPPER respectively.
alerts which have been correctly classified by the system but whose confidence
value is lower than the set threshold. However, less than 10 alerts (out of 100)
have been forwarded for manual classification when this action was not needed.
Table 8 reports the details regarding the evaluation of the confidence value.
2.2 Usability in Panacea
Panacea aims not only to provide automatic attack classification for an ABS, but
to improve usability as well. In automatic mode, Panacea performs an accurate
classification (more than 75% of correctly classified attacks). In semi-automatic
and manual modes, users take actively part in the classification process: how-
ever, users are requested to provide a limited input (i.e., a class label). Panacea
classifies attacks systematically and automates (1) the extraction of relevant in-
formation used to distinguish an attack class from another and (2) the update of
the classification model. These tasks are usually left to the user experience and
knowledge, thus they are not said to be neither error-free nor comprehensive.
Table 9 reports actions that users have to take with and without the support of
Panacea.
User actions
Without Panacea With Panacea
DSA Classify any alert No action to take
DSB Classify any alert Classify alerts used during training
DSC Classify any alert
No action to take
(alerts have been previously classified)
Table 9. Actions that users have to take with or without Panacea w.r.t. alert classifi-
cation for each data set we use during benchmarks.
3 Related work
Although the lack of attack classification is a well-known issue in the field of
anomaly-based intrusion detection, little research has been done on this topic.
Robertson et al. [7] suggest to use some heuristics to infer the class of (web-
based) attacks. This approach has several drawbacks. Users have to generate
heuristics (e.g., regular expressions) to identify attack classes. They have to
enumerate all of the possible attack variants, and update the heuristics each
time a new attack variation is detected. This is a time consuming task. Panacea
can operate in an automatic way, by extracting attack information from any
SBS, or employ an ad-hoc classification, with the user providing only the attack
class.
Wang and Stolfo [10] use a “Z-String” to distribute among other ABSs attack
payloads to enhance detection. A Z-String contains the information resulting
from the n-gram analysis of the attack payload. Once a certain payload has been
flagged as malicious, the corresponding Z-String can be distributed to other IDSs
to detect the attack also, and stop it at an early stage (think of a worm). If some
traffic matches a certain Z-String, that data is likely to be a real attack. Although
a Z-String is not used for attack classification, by attaching a class label it would
be possible to classify each attack. However, this approach is not systematic, as
each attack that does not exactly match any Z-String would have to be manually
classified. A Z-String is based on a frequency-based n-gram analysis, thus an
exact match could be difficult to achieve. On the other hand, Panacea applies
a systematic classification using the more precise binary-based n-gram analysis.
Panacea can also use as a source of information the alerts generated by an SBS,
and not only by an ABS.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter we present Panacea, a system that automatically and system-
atically classifies attacks generated by a payload-based ABS (and consequently
the generated alerts). Panacea extracts information from alerts during a training
phase, then predicts the attack class for new alerts. The alerts used to train the
classification engine can be generated by an SBS as well as an ABS. In the for-
mer case, no manual intervention is requested (the system operates in automatic
mode), as Panacea automatically extracts the attack class from the alert. In the
latter case, the user is required to provide the attack class for each alert used to
train the classification engine.
Panacea improves the usability and makes it possible to integrate anomaly-
based with signature-based IDSs, for instance by using security information man-
agement tools. Benchmarks show that the approach is effective in classifying at-
tacks, even those that have not been detected before (and not used for training).
Although Panacea works in an automatic way, users can employ ad-hoc classifi-
cations, and even manually tune the engine for more precise classifications.
Future work Panacea can use different algorithms to classify alerts. The bench-
marks with SVM and RIPPER, which approach the classification problem in two
different ways, show that each algorithm has its strong points, depending on the
circumstances. A possible extension is to use a cascade of SVM and RIPPER.
We would then use SVM for early classification (when the number of samples is
low, and when RIPPER does not perform well), then, when the number of alerts
increases, we can train RIPPER, thanks to the batch training mode, and use it
for classification as well (RIPPER performs better than SVM when the number
of training samples is high). By applying a voting schema to the classification
results provided by both algorithms for a given alert (for instance by considering
the confidence value and the number of training samples in a certain class), we
could be able to increase the overall accuracy.
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